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## **EGG 2018: Perspective sensitivity (week 1)**

Session 5: More data, Stephenson 2007, and summing up

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## Yesterday's class

- ▶ **“Faultless disagreement”**: the intuition that denials of utterances containing predicates of personal taste can differ in the perspectival centre that is understood
  - ▶ The interlocutors disagree on the taste judgment (relative to different perspectives).
  - ▶ The interlocutors both state something true. (see Lasersohn 2017)
- ▶ **Introduction of the account in Lasersohn 2017:**
  - ▶ predicates of personal taste depend on the perspective parameter  $p$
  - ▶  $p$  is not involved in determining content
  - ▶  $p$  is set pragmatically but there is a convention to set it to the speaker at the time and in the world of utterance

### Today:

- ▶ look at problematic data for Lasersohn 2017
- ▶ introduce the alternative system in Stephenson 2007



# Roadmap

Intro

More data: locatives vs. predicates of personal taste

An ambiguity account: Stephenson 2007

Overall summary



## Checking further parallels: locatives vs. predicates of personal taste

### Locatives:

(see Session 2)

- ▶ allow for more than one perspective per sentence

(1) [Context: A described a scene to B. B goes to check.]

B: A said that the left box was to the right.

- ▶ only relative to non-speaker perspectives connected to subjects

(2) A is talking with B about the left box. (possible: ✓ speaker, ✓ A, × B)

- ▶ allow for bound uses

(3) Every sports fan was at a local bar watching the playoffs.

Do we find similar data for predicates of personal taste?



## Data 1: more than one perspective in a sentence – I

Also possible for predicates of personal taste:

(4) The boring comedian talked to a funny philosopher.

⇒ *boring* – speaker's perspective

⇒ *funny* – speaker's perspective or comedian's perspective



## Data 1: more than one perspective in a sentence – I

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**Restriction:** shift-together-locally

(5) A said that Wei talked to a foreigner on the left.

⇒ same for predicates of personal taste:

(6) A said that B bought tasty cheese that was funny looking.

Can Lasersohn 2017 account for this restriction?



## Data 2: only non-speaker perspectives connected to subjects

- (7) **[Context:** There is a type of cheese that A really disliked at B's wine and cheese party, which happens to be B's favourite cheese. A wants to know more about that cheese so that he can avoid it in future.]
- a. A leads B to the tasty cheese.
  - b. A asks B for details about the tasty cheese.



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⇒ non-subject individuals seem to be similarly inaccessible for predicates of personal taste

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## Data 3: bound perspectives

- (8) [**Context:** Three men A, B, and C are at a bar. They each order their favourite drinks, which the others find disgusting. A orders beer with coke, B orders pina colada, and C orders rakija.]
- a. Every man was drinking a tasty beverage.



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- Every man was drinking a tasty beverage.
- (9) [**Context:** Three men A, B, and C are at a bar. They each order their favourite drinks, which the others find disgusting. They then decide to each have the drink ordered by someone else.]
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### Problem for Lasersohn 2017:

- ▶ binding relations are fixed at the level of content
- ▶ in Lasersohn's system, quantifiers are not defined for intensions (= cannot manipulate  $p$ ; see Chapters 3, 6)



## Taking stock

- ▶ Lasersohn's choice to locate  $p$  at the step from content to denotation was motivated by “faultless disagreement” data  
⇒ the perspective is not fixed on the level of content
- ▶ **Data 1-3:** there are grammatical restrictions on the choice of perspective and that quantifiers may manipulate the value of  $p$   
⇒ the perspective must be fixable at the level of content

How can this be reconciled?



## Stephenson 2007 – I

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- ▶ To capture judge/perspective sensitivity: **judge parameter  $j$**

$$(10) \quad \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{c;w,t,j}$$

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⇒ grouped with the world  $w$  and time of evaluation  $t$

⇒ same level as for Lasnik 1989



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- ▶ There is **one element that can directly access the judge parameter:**

$$(11) \quad \llbracket \text{PRO}_J \rrbracket^{c;w,t,j} = j$$

- ⇒ elements taking intensions as arguments may manipulate  $j$
- ⇒ same as for Lasersohn 2017



## Stephenson 2007 – II

- ▶ Predicates of personal taste do *not* depend on the judge parameter.

$$(12) \quad \llbracket \text{tasty} \rrbracket^{c;w,t,j} = \lambda x_e. \lambda y_e. y \text{ tastes good to } x \text{ in } w \text{ at } t$$

Compare with the proposals in Bylinina et al. 2015 and Lasersohn 2017:

$$(13) \quad \llbracket \text{tasty} \rrbracket^{\langle P_c, s_c \rangle} = \lambda x_e. x \text{ is tasty for } P_c$$

$$(14) \quad \llbracket \text{tasty} \rrbracket^{u,w,\langle x,t,a \rangle} = \\ \lambda y_e. \lambda t'_i. y \text{ is tasty at } t' \text{ in } w \text{ by the standards of } x \text{ at } t \text{ in } a$$



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- ▶ Predicates of personal taste are **ambiguous via their first arguments**
  - ▶ can become judge-dependent: *PRO<sub>J</sub>*
  - ▶ can have a pronominal perspectival centre: *pro*
  - ▶ can have an explicit perspectival centre: overt PP

⇒ unembedded speaker perspective → *PRO<sub>J</sub>*

⇒ non-speaker perspective → *pro*



## Stephenson 2007 – III

**Motivation:** comparison between epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste in attitude contents (Stephenson 2007: Sect. 2, 4.2)

- (15) a. Sam thinks it might be raining. (obligatorily depend on Sam)  
 b. Sam thinks it must be raining.
- (16) a. Sam thinks the dip is tasty. (optionally depend on Sam)  
 b. Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.

- ▶ **Assumption:** *think* quantifies over world-time-judge triples  
 ⇒ judges in the triples = the centers in centered worlds (see Lewis 1979)
- ▶ values for *j* in the accessible world-time-judge triples are bound to the attitude holder
- ▶ **Optional dependence on attitude holder:**  $PRO_j$  vs. *pro*



## Lasersohn 2017: Stephenson's prediction and a connected problem

- ▶ **Prediction:** no “faultless disagreement” with mixed speaker/non-speaker perspectives in the clashing utterances

(17) Sam: The tuna is tasty.

(for the cat)

Sue: ???No, it isn't!

(for Sue)



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- ▶ **Prediction:** no “faultless disagreement” with mixed speaker/non-speaker perspectives in the clashing utterances

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Sue: ???No, it isn't! (for Sue)

- ▶ **Problem for Stephenson:** (Lasersohn 2017: Ch 7)

(18) Mary: How did Bill like the rides?  
John: Well, the merry-go-round was fun, but the water slide was kind of scary.  
Fred: Oh, it was not! Your kid is just a weenie!

⇒ disagreement with mixed perspectives is possible



## Summary – I

- ▶ We looked at:
  - locatives, aesthetic/personal taste predicates, (epistemic modals)
- ▶ Three different ways to model perspective-sensitivity:
  - ▶ Bylinina et al. 2015:
    - parameter contributing to the content
    - perspective-sensitive expressions access the parameter
  - ▶ Lasersohn 2017:
    - parameter contributing to determining the denotation
    - perspective-sensitive expressions access the parameter
  - ▶ Stephenson 2007:
    - parameter contributing to determining the denotation
    - perspective-sensitive expressions wrt. the parameter
- ▶ Different accounts based on different sets of data!



## Summary – II

### We have not looked at:

- ▶ the behavior of perspective-sensitive expressions in attitude contents and how to account for that
  - ▶ other putative perspective-sensitive expressions: (see Session 1)
    - ▶ epistemic modals and evidentials
    - ▶ perspective-sensitive anaphora
    - ▶ degree-based adjectives
    - ▶ expressives and epithets
    - ▶ German discourse particles
- ⇒ how do they behave wrt. speaker-orientation, shifting, binding, ... ?
- ▶ **Question about modelling:** which (diverging) properties of (putative) perspective-sensitive expressions should be accounted for by an analysis of perspective sensitivity? All? Some? ...



## Literatur

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